中澳关系，智在权衡 PM strikes the right balance in managing China ties (Bilingual)
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James Laurenceson (罗震), Director, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney (院长, 澳中关系研究院, 悉尼科技大学) |
This article appeared in The Australian Financial Review on August 27 2020. This article includes a Simplified Chinese translation by Jun Wang, NAATI Level 3 translator (NAATI ID: 80136).
本文于2020年8月27日发表于澳大利亚金融评论。本文由 Jun Wang（NAATI三级翻译员; NAATI ID: 80136）翻译。
Prime Minister Scott Morrison says that Australia must ‘speak with one voice’ when engaging with foreign governments and their related entities. All eyes are on Beijing.
澳大利亚总理莫里森表示澳大利亚在处理外国政府及相关机构事务时应保持一致口径。现在所有的目光都聚焦在了北京方面。
This is the justification for moves by Canberra to increase its visibility and scrutiny of agreements struck by state and local governments, as well as public institutions such as universities. And, potentially, to terminate them.
联邦政府旨在进一步了解州、领地、地方政府及诸如大学等公立机构现有与外国政府及相关机构达成的协议并对其一一进行审查。部分现有协议面临被叫停的危险。
One reading is that a centralisation of power is long overdue. Foreign policy and national security are Commonwealth responsibilities, so it makes sense for the federal government to be running the show.
一种解读在于国家权力集中化不应长期悬而未决。由于外交政策及国家安全事务隶属联邦政府职责，因此其确实应该发挥决定性作用。
And having greater transparency around connections with foreign governments can hardly be complained about. The more, the better.
除此之外，与外国政府关系的透明化也是不容质疑的，也可以说与外国政府的关系的透明度越强，越符合国家利益。
It is also a reality that Australia’s external environment can shift. China in 2020 under President Xi Jinping is more troubling for Australia’s national interests than it was back in 2010 under Hu Jintao.
另一不争的事实是澳大利亚所处的外部环境正在发生变化。相比于2010年胡锦涛执政期间，2020年习近平执政下的中国给澳大利亚国家利益带来的困难有增无减。
For that reason, having an ability to revisit past deals is smart policy.
基于上述原因，若通过立法保障联邦政府有权审议相关协议不失为明智之举。
There’s even a positive reading available to those wanting to preserve strong China ties. In taking an approach that emphasises transparency and risk management, Morrison is fending off calls for a more aggressive decoupling that are disconnected from facts.
对于那些希望与中国维持强劲纽带关系的人来说，该政策也能带来一丝曙光。由于该政策强调透明性及风险管理，莫里森总理旨在利用此举摆脱许多并非基于事实却迫使澳中关系进一步脱钩的漩涡。
It’s no secret that a number of hairy-chested backbenchers and media commentators would prefer Canberra manage China relations by issuing edicts and bans. So too would the United States, which is fixated on China as an economic, strategic and ideological threat.
众所周知，部分强势的后座议员及媒体评论人则希望堪培拉通过颁布法令及实施制裁进而管理与中国的关系。由于美国视中国为经济、战略及意识形态上的威胁，部分美方团体希望美国政府对中国采取同样的方式。
The Morrison government has been deliberate in distancing itself from such extreme positions, including at the AUSMIN meetings in Washington last month. Instead, it has wisely kept options open with both of Australia’s ‘great and powerful friends’.
莫里森政府在包括于上月在华盛顿举行的澳美部长级会议及多个场合明确表明不与极端立场为伍。此外莫里森政府就如何应对这两个“强大朋友”的关系抱持着开放的态度。
In this reading Canberra is sending Beijing a message: we are giving ourselves the ability to take decisions you probably wouldn’t like. But we’ll only take them if you push us.
从这一角度出发，堪培拉正在给北京传递的信号是：我们可能会做令你不满的决定，但除非万不得已我们不会做这样的决定。
There is, however, a third reading that points to overreach.
联邦政府是否有权叫停现有签订协议还有第三种解读，且视联邦政府的行为有矫枉过正的嫌疑。
Sure, agreements such the one between Victoria and China on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have an element that involves foreign policy.
不可否认的是，在维多利亚州政府与中国政府所签订的有关一带一路倡议的协议中确有涉及外交政策的元素。
But they are also about supporting infrastructure development. And about attempting to smooth access to the only major global market expected to expand this year. And about promoting cultural exchange.
然而协议中也涉及支持基建开发、支持进入今年很有可能是唯一存在增长的全球主要市场及促进文化交流的内容。
In other words, providing local jobs and building vibrant communities. These are very much the responsibilities of state and local governments.
换而言之，该协议涉及创造当地就业机会及建立丰富社区的内容。而无论是创造就业岗位还是支持当地社区发展，都是隶属州、领地及地方政府的权力。
The worry is that the pendulum may swing wildly from one side of the spectrum, which sees only the opportunities from engagement with China, to the other side that sees only risks.
我们所担忧的则是外交政策的导向是否会从一个极端走向另一个极端；即从视中国关系为遍地黄金的一端走向风声鹤唳、草木皆兵的一端。
There is precisely zero evidence that in signing a non-legally binding memorandum of understanding Victoria has somehow undermined Australian foreign policy and Canberra’s capacity to act. The consistent and firm approach the Morrison government has taken to managing China relations makes that clear.
此外，即使维多利亚政府已签订了不具有法律效力的谅解备忘录，没有证据显示维多利亚州政府有任何迹象妨碍了联邦政府就外交政策采取行动及作决策的主动权。莫里森政府在处理中国关系上采取的一贯强势手段也证实了这一点
There are also benefits from experimentation and contestability. Might federal government ministers and bureaucrats learn something about how China seeks to use the BRI by talking to their Victorian counterparts and taking stock of their experiences?
若允许州、领地、地方政府及其他公共机构签订不伤害国家利益的协议并形成自由竞争机制也是有益处的，或许联邦政府的部长们可以从维多利亚州官员处更好的了解中国一带一路倡议并汲取经验。
Is the security and strategic blob in Canberra to be the sole source of authoritative advice, sidelining businesses, universities and community organisations around the country? Is it possible that with Victoria having these links, the bilateral relationship has received some political ballast during an otherwise turbulent period?
堪培拉独断专行的态度是否仅仅出于安全和战略考量呢？若为了国家安全和战略中的分歧是否就可以完全忽略了全国企业、大学和社区组织的切身利益呢？亦或是由于维多利亚州签订了该项协议，反而促使中澳两国在波折不断的时期得以负重前行呢？
Transparency only for others? 谁的透明性？
And let’s be frank: there’s more than a little hypocrisy involved, too. While demanding greater transparency from sub-national actors, the federal government has refused to release the text of its own agreement with China on co-operation with Belt and Road projects in third-party markets, struck in September 2017.
我们或许应该扪心自问：这里是不是存在一些伪善和双标？本次轰轰烈烈的要求州、领地、地方政府及其他公共机构向联邦政府披露相关协议信息的事件，不禁让人想起来了联邦政府拒绝披露与中方于2017年9月就第三方市场一带一路项目合作协议的信息。
The Australian government also, reasonably, pushes for greater transparency from China on the BRI projects it supports, particularly those in our Pacific neighbourhood. Yet in November last year it refused to make public the details of a $442 million loan extended to Papua New Guinea. Export Finance Australia said that terms for such deals were negotiated on a case-by-case basis, and were commercially sensitive.
无可厚非，澳大利亚政府同样呼吁中国政府就其支持的一带一路倡议中的项目，特别是太平洋地区内澳大利亚邻国和地区的支持项目进行更大程度的披露。但在去年11月澳大利亚政府拒绝向公众披露政府向巴布亚新几内亚提供价值4.42亿元的贷款的相关信息。澳大利亚出口融资局（Export Finance Australia）声称协议条款视具体情况而商定，且为商业敏感信息。
Good luck if Victoria or China were to try that one on.
如果维多利亚州政府和中国想尝试一下，那就不知道后果如何了。
In the end, if the Morrison government has its way and the legislation proceeds, much will depend on whether Canberra is able to exercise balance and restraint in the face of what will no doubt be well-connected and louder calls to exercise its authority.
如果莫里森政府有办法让立法通过，之后就取决于堪培拉是否有能力权衡利弊平衡关系，毫无疑问，这背后是错综复杂的权力博弈。
Treasurer Josh Frydenberg’s recent decision to stop a Chinese company acquiring a dairy and drinks manufacturer from a Japanese owner, without explaining why it was deemed contrary to the national interest, doesn’t inspire confidence.
财政部长乔什·弗莱登伯格（Josh Frydenberg）最近阻止了一家中国公司从日本所有者手中收购一家乳制品饮料制造商，但没有解释为什么这被认为违背国家利益。这一举措令人费解。
Meanwhile, yesterday China’s deputy head of mission offered a mostly conciliatory speech at the National Press Club in Canberra. Such olive branches ought to be seized.
与此同时，昨天中国大使馆王晰宁公使在堪培拉国家新闻俱乐部发表措辞温和的演讲。 这种橄榄枝应该及时被抓住。
Author (作者):
Professor James Laurenceson is Director of the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney.
本文作者为悉尼科技大学澳中关系研究院院长。
