Economics Discipline Group UTS Business School University of Technology Sydney NSW 2007 Australia

Education	
Ph.D. in Economics, Department of Economics	1 + 0.017 + 0.000 ( 1 + 1)
University of Technology Sydney (UTS), Australia	Jul.2017-2022 (expected)
MPhil in Economics (withdrawal)	
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SUFE), China	Sep.2013-Dec.2016
B.S. in Management	C 2000 I 2019
East China University of Political Science and Law (ECUPL), China	Sep.2009-Jun.2013
Research Interests	
Market Design, Mechanism Design, Industrial Organization	
Teaching Experience	
Teaching Assistant for Mathematics for Economics,	
Undergraduate level, UTS	Aug.2019-Nov.2019
Teaching Aggistant for Migrosconomia Theory I	
Master level. SUFE	Sep.2015-Jan.2016
Teaching Assistant for Game Theory	
Master level, SUFE	Mar.2015-Jun.2015
Research Experience	
Research Assistant for Assoc. Prof. Jun Zhang	Aug.2018-Dec.2019
Conferences and Workshops	
$34^{th}$ Ph.D. Conference in Economics and Business, Queensland, Australia	Nov.2021
2021 UTS Ph.D. Conference, Sydney, Australia	Sep.2021
2020 UTS Ph.D. Conference, Sydney, Australia	Aug.2020
2019 UTS Ph.D. Conference, Sydney, Australia	Aug.2019
Frontiers in Market Design and Analysis Hordern Winter School, Melbourne, Aus	tralia Jul.2019
Grants and Awards	
The Best Second Year Paper (UTS)	Aug.2019
International Research Scholarship (UTS)	Jul.2017-Dec.2021
Ross Milbourne Research Scholarship in Economics (UTS)	Jul.2017-Feb.2021
First-Class Graduate School Academic Scholarship (SUFE)	Sep.2013-Dec.2016

## **Research Papers**

# "Affirmative Actions with Multi-Dimensional Privileged Types" (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: Controlled school choice programs require considering students' priorities while maintaining the diversity constraints on the composition of students. In many real-world applications, students may belong to more than one disadvantaged type (e.g. a student may both belong to the minority and the financially distressed group.) In addition, they may have weak preference orders over the channels through which they would possibly be enrolled (e.g. a student from a poor family may be granted a scholarship). This paper

provides a sequential reservation choice rule for a school reserving positions for targeted groups where students have multiple privileged types and have weak preferences over the types they would be enrolled. The sequential reservation choice rule assigns as many reserved seats to the students as possible by sophisticatedly reshuffling the reserved seats to the eligible students. We show that three axioms (eliminating justified envy, no swapping condition and non-wastefulness) can characterize the proposed choice rule. We further show that the choice rule can be implemented in polynomial time. Finally, the proposed choice rule is bilaterally substitutable so that it can result in a stable outcome when imbeded into the cumulative offering process.

#### "Optimal Auction Design with Referral" (with Jun Zhang)

Abstract: This paper establishes the optimal auction when a seller can incentivize an existing buyer to refer a privately known potential buyer to compete for an object. We identify three optimal channels to provide referral incentives: discouraging non-referral, favoring referral, and providing informational rent for referral. While the first two channels always appear and are essential, the third one is supplementary and appears when the potential buyer is less likely to exist and stronger. We also provide conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented by simple mechanisms. Finally, we show that the conventional resale mechanism is suboptimal.

#### **Related Skills**

Language: Mandarin (Native); English (Fluent) Software: Python; LATEX; Stata

### References

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Assoc. Prof. Jun Zhang (Co-supervisor)
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Dr. Kentaro Tomoeda (Co-supervisor)
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